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At Last, the End of the Tunnel 

By John O. Bornhofen 
As of early April, it is apparent that the 
Great Recession of 1981-82 is finally 
over, and the economy has embarked 
on its long-awaited expansion. In a later 
article, we will review the reasons why 
the economy behaved as it did, why the 
recession occurred, and why it went on 
so long. In this article, we will look at 
what happened during the last two years 
and the likely outlook for 1983. 
The Recession Just Ended 
The recession probably ended last 
December, after beginning in July, 1981. 
This duration of one and a half, years 
made it the longest since World War II, 
although not the deepest. 
The best measure of overall economic 
activity is real Gross National Product, 
which measures total production of all 
final goods and services in the American 
economy, after adjustment for inflation. 
It fell at a seasonally adjusted annual rate 
of 1.1 percent from the second quarter 
of 1981 to the fourth quarter of 1982. 
Accordingly, since the real output fell, 
fewer workers were needed, and em­
ployment fell while unemployment rose. 
The number of people employed 
dropped from almost 100.9 mUlion in 
July, 1981, to 99.1 million in December, 
1982. In that same period, the number 
of unemployed rose from 7.8 million to 
12 million. Accordingly, the unemploy­
ment rate rose from 7.2 percent in July, 
1981, to 10.7 percent in December, 
1982. Both the number of the unem­
ployed and the rate (unemployment as 
a percentage of the labor force) were 
postwar records. 
The decline in total output was evi­
dent from the decline in the utilization of 
business productive capacity (plant and 
equipment). The Federal Reserve's 
measure of capacity utilization in manu­
facturing dropped from almost 80 per­
cent in mid-1981 to 67.5 percent in 
December, a postwar low. This mirrored 
the decline in industrial production of 12 
percent during the recession. 
The reduction in sales, production, 
and capacity utilization are all mani­
fested in the "bottom line" for business­
profits. Corporate profits before taxes 
and other adjustments plunged almost 
23 percent between the third quarter of 
1981 and the fourth quarter of 1982, 
and the decline for big industrial com­
panies such as those in the Dow-Jones 
Industrial (stock) Average was even 
greater. 
The decline in production was not 
across the board, however; it never is. 
This time it was accounted for by notice­
able declines in consumer purchases of 
"big-ticket" items (until the end of 1982), 
in business investment in plant and 
equipment and inventories, and in ex­
ports to foreign countries, and by a very 
slight decline in state and local govern­
ment purchases of goods and services, 
all in real terms. The reduction in busi­
ness inventories, always a factor in reces­
sions, was especially sharp this time. 
From the third quarter of 1981 to the 
fourth quarter of 1982, inventories fell 
by $30 billion. Personal consumption 
expenditures by households on non­
durable goods and services rose, as did 
Federal Government expenditures on 
goods and services. 
The surprising part of Federal govern­
ment spending on goods and services 
(not transfer payments) is that, in spite of 
President Reagan's efforts to get it under 
control, it still rose, even after adjustment 
for inflation. And, contrary to popular 
belief, non-defense spending was rising 
faster than defense spending! This at a 
time when investment in our future pro­
ductive capacity, which is necessary to 
maintain and advance our standard of 
living, was falling. 
Not all the news was bad in the last 
two years, however. The severe costs of 
the recession (lost output to all and mis­
ery to some) did bring a benefit­
reduced inflation. By all measures, infla­
tion was much less severe at the end of 
the recession than at the beginning. The 
inflation rate on the general (GNP) price 
index fell from 9 percent in the third 
quarter of 1981 to 3.7 percent in the 
fourth quarter of 1982. The inflation in 
producer's prices was also moderate. 
That index rose only 3.8 percent during 
the recession. Those facts notwithstand­
ing, the progress against inflation was 
most impressive on consumer prices. The 
consumer price index, which was rising 
at almost 15 percent annually in JUly, 
1981, rose only 2.3 percent annually 
during the second half of 1982. These 
declines notwithstanding, however, in­
flation has not ended. More on this later. 
Personal income-the income of the 
household sector-continued to grow in 
nominal terms despite the recession, • 
creaSing at a 6.6 percent rate. All sources 
of personal income continued to grow 
although at reduced rates from the past, 
except for the rental income of house­
holds, which actually declined. The 
sources rising the fastest were transfer 
payments, followed by interest income, 
dividends, fringe benefits for labor, wages 
and salaries, and the income of proprie­
tors, in that order. Transfer payments 
increased over 19 percent from mid­
1981 to December, 1982, because of 
the rise in joblessness due to the reces­
sion and in spite of President Reagan's 
well-publicized attempts to curb social 
spending at the Federal level. 
As would be expected, interest rates 
dropped sharply during the recession. 
Treasury bUi rates went from 15-16 per­
cent in mid-1981 to 8 percent in Decem­
ber, 1982, and AAA corporate bonds fell 
from over 15 percent to below 12 per­
cent in the same period. The prime rate 
at banks also declined, from over 20 per­
cent to 11 percent. 
Prices of common stock declined d~ 
ing the recession, until August, 19~ 
Then they jumped, in one of the most 
spectacular surges on record. For exam­
ple, the New York Stock Exchange com­
posite index of stock prices fell 18 per­
cent from June, 1981, to July, 1982, but 
then rose at an astounding annual rate of 
64 percent from July to December, 1982. 
The First Part of 1983 
The first quarter of 1983 showed the 
first sustained evidence of economic ex­
panSion since early 1981. If the whole 
year continues as it began-and it is ex­
pected to-it will be a year of improve­
ment. Real GNP rose at a 3. 1 percent 
seasonally adjusted annual rate in the 
most recent quarter. Reflecting this in­
crease, industrial production and capital 
utilization also grew and, spurred on by 
lower interest rates, the rise in housing 
starts continued to accelerate. Although 
employment remained unchanged, the 
civilian unemployment rate edged down 
to 10. 1 percent in March. 
Inflation continued to abate in the first 
quarter. While the GNP deflator index 
rose faster than in the previous quart 
the CPI and Producer's Price index w 
flat. They indicate that inflation has bee 
throttled, but only temporarily. 
continued on page 5 
2 
At Last, the End of the Tunnel continuedfrompage2 
a All of these results are consistent with 
Wfset of Federal government policies that 
have been expansionary for at least nine 
months. Federal fiscal policy is still stim­
ulative in that the deficit that would be 
expected if the economy were operating 
at a high-employment level is very large. 
According to the Government's own es­
timates, the Federal budget would have 
a deficit of $40+ billion in 1983 even 
if the economy were operating at a 
high level of output and employment, 
rather than just rising from a cyclically 
depressed level. Other estimates of the 
high-employment deficit are even higher. 
As things are, the Federal deficit is 
expected to be around $200 billion this 
year. Since Federal spending is adding 
more to aggregate demand for goods 
and services than Federal taxes are tak­
ing out, the Federal budget is stimulative 
in the direct sense. However, the deficit 
must be financed, and that financing is 
keeping interest rates high. High interest 
rates hold down private demand for 
goods and services, because they repre­
sent the cost of borrowing and the return 
from lending instead of spending. These 
~direct effects offset some of the direct 
':::ffects of the Federal fiscal stimulus. This 
is "crowding-out," and, unfortunately, it 
will get even worse as economic activity 
picks up and private credit demands rise. 
The Federal Reserve's monetary pol­
icy has also been expansionary since 
mid-1982. All of the monetary aggre­
gates, such as Ml (the stock of money in 
currency and transactions-type bal­
ances), total reserves, the monetary base 
(total reserves and currency), and M2 
(the more broadly-defined stock of 
money), have been rising rapidly. Ml has 
risen at a seasonally adjusted annual rate 
of over 15 percent since September. It 
has been fueled by an 11 + percent in­
crease in the monetary base and a 14+ 
percent rise in total reserves since Sep­
tember. And since the first of the year, 
this growth has accelerated. 
While there is presently much idle ca­
pacity and unemployment in the econ­
omy to absorb the additional demand 
that monetary expansion can bring 
about, it would be easy for the Federal 
Reserve to go too far in this regard. Ex­
cessive monetary growth of the magni-
Aude we have been seeing of late has ~ypically been associated with high and 
accelerating rates of inflation in subse­
quent periods. Indeed, the stubbornly 
high level of interest rates we see in the 
financial markets is consistent with the 
view that those markets expect inflation 
to bottom out soon and to speed up in 
the future. 
Rapid outbursts of monetary growth 
for relatively short periods of time, such 
as we are now witnessing, are no substi­
tute for a steady, moderate growth of 
money, period after period, to the extent 
that that is achievable. The recent strong 
rise in M2, total reserves, and the mone­
tary base indicate that there is more going 
on than just funds being shifted out of 
checking and saving deposits and money 
market funds and into the new "Super 
NOW" and "Money Market Deposit Ac­
counts" at banks and thrift institutions. 
The growth of the monetary aggregates 
has been excessive and must be brought 
under control before it really has an im­
pact on total demand and expectations 
of future inflation. The major danger to 
the recovery is the possibility that the 
Fed will continue to inflate the money 
stock at excessive rates and then slam on 
the brakes as they have done so often in 
the past. It is assumed here that the Fed 
has learned from its past mistakes and 
will not repeat them at this juncture. 
The Outlook for the Rest of 1983 
It is antiCipated that the growth in the 
first three months will continue through­
out 1983 but at a slightly faster rate. This 
is supported by a number of factors such 
as the stimulative monetary and fiscal 
policies cited above, rising leading indi­
cators, rising housing starts, improving 
measures of consumer confidence, and 
surveys of corporate purchasing agents 
that indicate that production and orders 
are up and that inventories are very lean. 
Other positive factors are the recent de­
clines in oil prices and the orderly way in 
which the debt of Third-World and East­
ern bloc countries is being rescheduled 
by commercial banks. 
For the rest of 1983, the expansion 
will be unbalanced, as most are at this 
stage. Consumption spending by the 
household sector, including spending on 
durables, will lead the way. While this 
will include an increase in the demand 
for new cars, domestic auto production 
is expected to increase less rapidly than 
in previous expansions, because of high 
new-car prices, stiff foreign competition, 
and a changed role for automobiles. 
Nevertheless, car production and sales 
should improve as incomes pick up, and 
Michigan should experience noticeable 
improvement. 
Other sectors of demand will be 
mixed. Housing construction should be 
strong reflecting the sizeable decline in 
mortgage interest rates in recent months. 
Government purchases of goods and 
services in the market will increase (in 
real terms) and help buttress consumer 
spending. Business spending for inven­
tories should increase modestly as the 
expansion unfolds, but expenditures on 
fixed plant and equipment will lag be­
hind the rest of the economy at least until 
the second half. This reflects the abun­
dance of unused plants and equipment 
along with the business sector's severe 
cash flow problems over the last 18 
months. High real interest rates are keep­
ing many projects from being profitable 
and are still holding down investment. 
Our net export position should con­
tinue to weaken in the coming months 
because of several factors. Among these 
are the strong dollar in the foreign ex­
change markets which is keeping foreign 
imports cheap and making U.S. exports 
to the rest of the world expensive. Also, 
the recovery in incomes in the U.S. will 
induce people to buy more goods from 
abroad, thus increasing our imports. In 
addition, the recession in much of the 
rest of the world and the lack of buying 
power on the part of the less-developed 
countries will also hold down demand 
for American goods. All told, net exports 
(exports minus imports) should continue 
to weaken and hold down the growth of 
domestic demand. 
All in all, we are looking for about a 4 
percent growth in real GNP for the cal­
endar year 1983. Employment will rise 
as the economy picks up, but trend 
growth in the labor force along with a 
cyclical return of "discouraged" workers 
will keep unemployment high. The un­
employment rate should average 9.5 to 
10 percent for the year. Inflation should 
continue to be moderate, averaging 3 to 
5 percent depending on the price index. 
Modest expansion of demand along with 
favorable price performances by food 
and petroleum will also insure no real 
resurgence of inflation this year. 
In short, 1983 looks even more like it 
will be a fairly good year, and 1984 looks 
good also. 
Dr. John O. Bornhofen is an Associate Pro­
fessor ofEconomics and Finance, Chairman 
of the Finance Department, Seidman School 
of Business, Grand Valley State College. 
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